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JANE AUSTEN’S PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 
Peter A. Appel* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between a society and its law is inexact.  Despite 
repeated claims that law mirrors societal norms and values, no scholar has 
punctured that balloon of an idea better than Alan Watson.  In his 
groundbreaking Legal Transplants1 and many subsequent works, Alan has 
demonstrated the many disjunctures between law and society.2  Alan has 
devoted a large part of his impressive corpus of scholarship on legal 
development to expand on this idea, and he has convincingly demonstrated 
that legal development often occurs through borrowing and accident as much 
as deliberate societal decision.  For example, Alan has painstakingly traced 
how the dictates and opinions of the ancient Roman jurists, who were 
pagans, were incorporated into Justinian’s Digest, which was produced by a 
committee at the direction of a Christian emperor living in Byzantium.3  
Roman law, and particularly the Digest, in turn, was later rediscovered and 
became the most influential source of law for continental Europe.4  In a more 
contemporary example, Alan has shown how the civil code for Turkey—
which by that point had become a secular country with a largely Islamic 
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Essay to my parents, Leonard and June Appel.  They have bestowed upon me riches far 
beyond what any entailed lands could. 
 1 See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the practice and effects, over time and in various societies, of 
adopting foreign legal systems). 
 2 See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 5 (2d ed. 2001) (“[T]he divergence 
between law and the needs or wishes of the people involved or the will of the leaders of the 
people is marked.”). 
 3 ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN PRIVATE LAW 193 (expanded ed. 2001) 
(“[T]he great Digest of the Christian Byzantine emperor Justinian is, in its contents, a 
transplant from the pagan Roman jurists, a world away.”). 
 4 Id. at 214–17. 
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population—essentially lifted the Swiss civil code (which itself was based on 
the earlier principles of Roman law) for its contents.5 
Alan has also shown that accidental borrowings and mistranslations have 
made enormous differences in legal outcomes.  His most impressive example 
for American audiences is his demonstration that the reliance on a poor 
translation of a European work may have misinformed Justice Story’s views 
on conflicts of laws, which in turn led to a central portion of the Supreme 
Court’s fateful and notorious decision in Dred Scott.6 
Throughout the impressive corpus of his work, Alan has also devoted 
time to the relationship between law and literature.  Specifically, Alan has 
used the rules and principles of ancient Roman and Jewish law to illuminate 
and explicate the stories in the Christian Gospels.7  As with his work on legal 
transplants generally, law shapes an understanding of the stories in the 
Gospels.  Obviously, Roman law during the Empire had nothing to do with 
the culture and society of its province of Judea.  Jewish law at the time was 
also somewhat in flux, since there were several sects of Judaism (e.g., the 
Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Essenes) who disputed the exact content of that 
system of law.8  Alan’s work shows why Jesus and his actions presented a 
challenge to both the Roman and Jewish legal systems.  For example, 
according to the Gospels, Jesus healed people on the Sabbath, which was 
contrary to Jewish law concerning work on the day of rest.9 
Nevertheless, Alan has not in his published work extended these 
observations to the relationships among law, society, and more recent 
literature.  Like the relationship between law and society, the relationship 
between realistic literature and the society in which that literature is 
produced is inexact.  Comparing the literature of a society and the law of a 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Id. at 14–18. 
 6 ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT 
OF LAWS (1992).  In that work, Alan demonstrated that Justice Story’s views were based on a 
poor translation of the work of the Dutch scholar Huber, even though a better translation of 
Huber was available at the time.  Id. at 19.  Story’s work, in turn, informed the Dred Scott 
decision.  Id. at 61–67.  In this vein, Alan’s work and influence were an inspiration for some 
of my own reflections on legal scholarship, the errors it can contain, and how those errors are 
often replicated in future works.  See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Roman Law: A Case 
Study in the Hazards of Legal Scholarship, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 33 (2002) 
(demonstrating how an erroneous assertion that the modern American procedural device of 
intervention had its basis in Roman law has been repeated in other scholarship). 
 7 See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, JESUS: A PROFILE (1998); ALAN WATSON, JESUS AND THE LAW 
(1996) [hereinafter WATSON, JESUS AND THE LAW]; ALAN WATSON, JESUS AND THE JEWS: THE 
PHARISAIC TRADITION IN JOHN (1995); ALAN WATSON, THE TRIAL OF JESUS (1995). 
 8 Menahem Mansoor & Philip Davies, Essenes, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 510–12 (2d 
ed. 2007); Menaham Mansoor, Pharisees, in 16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 30–32 (2d. 2007); 
Menahem Mansoor, Sadducees, in 17 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA,654–55 (2d ed. 2007). 
 9 WATSON, JESUS AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 14–15. 
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society would predictably produce funhouse mirror images of each and of the 
underlying society.  Yet comparisons between and among law and literature 
and society are not useless.  What if a particular work of literature did 
accurately depict a particular society, its norms, customs, and expectations, 
but botched the law?  In that case, literature serves as a truer mirror of 
society but a funhouse mirror of law.  This relationship would importantly 
shed light on how and where law and society are out of sync, one of the 
major themes of Alan’s work. 
The law of property and literary depictions of that body of law provide 
several instances of this phenomenon, none more prominent than the 
entailment in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice.10  The entailment has 
figured into many other literary works—from Trollope’s novels to the recent 
PBS series Downton Abbey—but Pride and Prejudice stands out as the most 
prominent example. 
English land law traditionally struggled with attempts to keep property 
within the family and restrict the ability of one member of the family to sell 
it.  One such device was the entailment (also known as the fee tail), which 
allowed the patriarch of a family to pass property to one line of the family.  If 
that line failed to produce descendants or if the descendants were not of the 
right sex (generally, male), the land would pass to another, more distant line 
of the family.  The entailment figures prominently in English literature to 
illustrate the struggle of this dynastic desire against the emerging social 
mores of the eighteenth century and later years.  Most especially, the entail 
provides authors with a means to comment on the widespread conflict over 
whether marriage should be based on the advantageousness of the 
relationship from an economic perspective, or whether it should be based 
simply on love (or, what is sometimes called by the burdensome term 
“companionate marriage”).  Many works throughout literature, both tragic 
and comic, feature this tension, but the entailment provided a particular 
reason to favor economics over emotions.  The dry-eyed regard for economic 
pragmatism is because of the lasting economic effects of the entailment on a 
family’s future and the role that wealth in property played in England. 
The entailment serves as a principal motif in Pride and Prejudice.  The 
problems it creates for the family at the center of the action (the Bennets) 
drive their actions and provide a reference point for how wise or foolishly 
they behave.  The Bennet daughters stood to lose any interest in Longbourn, 
the family estate, because the estate was settled so that it had to pass to a 
male relative.  In their family’s case, the relative was the horrid, long-
winded, and—in a spectacular and amusing combination—obsequious 
                                                                                                                   
 10 JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (Bantam Classic Edition, 1981) (1813). 
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and patronizing Mr. Collins, their cousin.  The entail provides the necessary 
impetus for Mrs. Bennet and her daughters to quest for someone to marry; 
any failings by the daughters to find a suitable mate (and one notable failure 
occurs in the youngest daughter, Lydia) are taken gravely.  Indeed, Mrs. 
Bennet suggests that one of her daughters (Elizabeth, the novel’s heroine) 
marry Mr. Collins to avoid the dire consequences of the entail.11  Elizabeth 
refuses, with her father’s explicit approval.12  Fortunately, everything works 
out in the end, because Elizabeth marries the extremely wealthy Mr. Darcy, 
and her older sister Jane also marries well to Mr. Bingley.13 
The entailment of Longbourn also provides insight into the character of 
Mr. Bennet and his ability to provide for his family.  The entailment damns 
the family of females to a future of poverty and displacement, a seeming 
triumph of the law of property over Austen’s notions of justice and common 
sense.  Readers often look at the hapless Mr. Bennet with a bit of pity, since 
it appears that the entail ties his hands and that he can do nothing to help his 
daughters. 
Austen created a nice melodrama, but she nevertheless got the law wrong.  
At the time that Austen wrote, it would have been extremely unlikely that a 
landed family like the Bennets would have used the entailment standing 
alone as the legal means of keeping Longbourn within the family.  More 
likely, they would have used a device known as the strict settlement, which is 
explained in more detail below.14  It was also extremely rare (although not 
impossible) that a strict settlement would have been arranged to cut off close 
relations like the Bennet daughters.15  If the restriction on Longbourn was an 
entailment standing alone—which would have in all likelihood cut off any 
provision for the Bennet daughters—then the current life tenant (i.e., Mr. 
Bennet) could have “ ‘barr[ed]’ the entail.”16  This term means that Mr. 
Bennet could have stopped the property from going to Mr. Collins through a 
fairly simple legal proceeding.17  After that, he could have left it to 
whomever he wished: Jane, the eldest daughter; Elizabeth, his clear favorite; 
or all five of his daughters in whatever shares he chose. 
If these legal conclusions are correct, then one must revisit Austen’s work 
and decipher how the restrictions on property actually worked in Pride and 
Prejudice.  In particular, one must determine how the entailment, or 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Id. at 53, 79. 
 12 Id. at 85. 
 13 Id. at 289. 
 14 See infra notes 30–39 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 30–39 and accompanying text. 
 16 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 319 (3d ed. 1990). 
 17 See infra notes 42–63 and accompanying text. 
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entailment-like devices such as the strict settlement, actually functioned in 
English families in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as 
opposed to how they might function or what the law said may happen to the 
family.  Although we can tell easily from the text what the Bennet family 
expected would happen upon Mr. Bennet’s death, knowing the actual details 
for Longbourn is no easy task.  Not only is Pride and Prejudice a work of 
fiction and therefore not based on an actual legal record, but Austen does not 
provide her readers with an actual grant from a Bennet family patriarch for 
legal scholars to interpret or any indication about what that patriarch’s intent 
might be other than what the Bennets themselves supposed. 
Nevertheless, Pride and Prejudice provides a good start for these 
questions for two interrelated reasons.  First, Austen’s use of property 
settlements in Pride and Prejudice is divergent from the expected legal 
realities of the time.  As mentioned earlier, most families then would have 
used the strict settlement (which likely would not have cut off the daughters).  
If the property was simply entailed, Mr. Bennet could have barred the entail.  
Second, Austen was an extremely sharp observer of many social realities 
and, particularly, the social rules regarding property settlements.  Either she 
knew or she did not know about the legal details of the entailment when she 
used it as a central plot device in Pride and Prejudice.  Either way, Austen’s 
use of the entailment illustrates the enormous gap that can exist between law 
and the way that society observes law. 
In this Essay, I will first outline the general development of different 
means used to hold property and keep it within a family in England.  This 
discussion must of necessity be brief and schematic, and therefore readers 
should not rely on it as a completely accurate, nuanced, and detailed 
discussion of the historical development of English land law.  I will then 
examine what Austen has to say about Longbourn, the principal property in 
Pride and Prejudice, which leads me to conclude that Austen probably 
conceived of Longbourn as being entailed and not secured under a strict 
settlement.  I will also provide another novel, John Galt’s The Entail, or the 
Lairds of Grippy,18 as a relatively contemporary point of comparison to 
demonstrate that Austen probably conceived of the arrangement for 
Longbourn similarly.  Then, I will explore the implications of Austen’s use 
of the entailment, whether or not she knew of the limitations of the 
entailment, and whether or not her audience knew of these limitations.  My 
ultimate conclusion is that, whether or not Austen or her audience knew 
about the ins and outs of the entailment, we have much to learn about the 
relationship between a society and its law from this literary treatment of law. 
                                                                                                                   
 18 JOHN GALT, THE ENTAIL, OR THE LAIRDS OF GRIPPY (Ian A. Gordon ed., 1970) (1823). 
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II.  ENTAILMENT: LEGAL BACKGROUND 
English land law struggled with ways that a family could lock up land 
ownership.  Two basic strains compete in any such struggle to ensure that the 
same property stays within the same family.  On the one hand, a landowner 
would want to do with his19 land whatever he wanted, and the most pressing 
desire for most family patriarchs was keeping land within the family 
perpetually.  We might call this desire the “dynastic urge.”  Having land in 
the family would provide steady income (through rents, income from timber 
and mineral development, etc.) as well as social prestige. 
On the other hand, if land is tied up forever within one family, it is also 
not as valuable as it might be as an economic commodity.  No one person 
can ever sell all of the interests in a particular piece of property to another if 
others in future generations have legally-recognized interests attached to the 
property.  For example, if A has a life estate in land and B has the remainder 
in fee simple, A can only sell his life interest, which is considerably less 
valuable than the whole property (life estate plus the future interest).  After 
all, anyone buying the land from A would not pay as much knowing that his 
interest would terminate upon A’s death.  This result means that land would 
be less valuable and harder to transfer, even if transfer would be in the 
overall best interest of the family.  We might call the tendency to keep land 
to sell the “desirability of alienability.” 
English land law struggled with the fight of the dynastic urge against the 
desirability of alienability for centuries.  Moreover, the struggle was often an 
internecine one within the members of the bench and bar.  After all, as a 
lawyer (for example) gained wealth in the profession, he depended on the 
availability of marketable land when he had amassed sufficient wealth to 
purchase an estate and thus possibly enter the landed class.  Of course, once 
he purchased land, he wanted devices to exist to make sure that profligate 
heirs did not dissipate this hard-won struggle for land and thus for 
respectability.20 
                                                                                                                   
 19 For ease, I will simply use the masculine pronoun in this description.  That reflects the 
vast majority of property owners and grantors at the time.  Austen, of course, provides one 
notable example of a landed woman, namely Lady Catherine de Bourgh.  I discuss that 
instance in the text below. 
 20 Brian Simpson makes the same observation.  A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND 
LAW 208–09 (2d ed. 1986); see also Sandra Macpherson, Rent to Own; or, What’s Entailed in 
Pride and Prejudice, 82 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 7 (2003) (“[B]y the seventeenth century entails 
were primarily favored by the newly gentried, successful lawyers, merchants, or tradesmen 
who’d amassed fortune enough to purchase an estate they didn’t want to see wasted, 
mortgaged, or sold by profligate heirs.”).   
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One of the earliest devices invented to further the dynastic urge was the 
entailment.  In the statute De donis conditionalibulus,21 Parliament 
recognized an estate in land that came to be called the fee tail or the 
entailment.  This estate would be created if an owner (O) granted to another 
person (A) an estate described as being from O to A and “the heirs of his 
body.”22  The courts interpreted this grant to mean that the land would pass 
from O to A, and then to the descendants of A (usually the eldest son of A 
under the rule of primogeniture, which is not directly related to this Essay).  
What if A died without descendants, or, more likely, what if the line of 
descendants (the issue) that A produced died without any further 
descendants?  The original instrument creating the entail usually took care of 
that fairly foreseeable possibility.  Usually, the original owner would grant 
the land “from O to my first son A and the heirs of his body, and upon the 
failure of issue from A then to my second child B and the heirs of his (or her) 
body, and upon failure of issue from B then to my third child C and the heirs 
of her (or his) body,” and so on.  Such a device would make sure that the 
land would stay within the extended family.  O could also specify that the 
land had to pass to male heirs by specifying “from O to A and the heirs male 
of his body,” with the limitations over to heirs male of B and C if desired. 
Over time, the fee tail in England gradually lost its usefulness as a means 
of satisfying the dynastic urge because the courts decided that an entail could 
be barred and the land thus freely alienated.  The procedural means of 
barring the entail was the suit for the common recovery, and it was first 
clearly established in the 1472 decision in Taltarum’s Case,23 although it 
may have some earlier roots.24  According to some legal historians, use of 
this device increased during the War of the Roses.  The king would recover 
the land of traitorous barons upon beating them on the battlefield.  However, 
if the land was entailed, the traitorous baron had only an interest for life to be 
forfeited, and once the traitorous baron died (e.g., through combat or a 
gruesome execution for treason), the land would revert to the next tenant in 
line.  Because the next in line was generally the traitorous baron’s son or a 
close relative, a new foe would rise up in the patriarch’s place, having land 
(and therefore money) and fresh motive to wage battle anew.  Clearly, for the 
                                                                                                                   
 21 The Statute of Westminster of 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (containing De donis conditionalibus, 
the chapter that originated the law of entail). 
 22 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *112. 
    23 See Charles D. Spinosa, The Legal Reasoning Behind the Common, Collusive Recovery: 
Taltarum’s Case (1472), 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70 (1992); see also Charles J. Reid, The 
Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 265 
(1995). 
 24 For a more thorough history of the common recovery, see SIMPSON, supra note 20, at 
129–35. 
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king to wipe out a family completely, he had to wipe out the entailment of 
lands.  The common recovery allowed the king to do this.25 
This historical setting for the barrable entail in England explains an 
anomaly in land law in what is now the United Kingdom.  Scottish land law 
continued to recognize the unbarrable entail, at least until the mid-1800s.  
Thus, English estates that were entailed could be disentailed, but Scottish 
ones could not.26  This difference will figure into the discussion of the 
literature below. 
The common recovery in England had a somewhat checkered history for 
two reasons.  First, from a jurisprudential standpoint it was hard to explain 
why the common recovery worked at all since it essentially was a collusive 
action.27  Second, it was unclear when families (as opposed to the king) 
would resort to barring an entail.  Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes found one 
instance in which one Anselm of the Guise family attempted to disinherit his 
brother and leave the family estate to Anselm’s own bastard sons—that is, 
what remained of the family estate after Anselm himself had depleted much 
of it.28  Then again, Heal and Holmes also give an example of one Sir Robert 
Strode, who disentailed his lands so that his daughter could inherit them 
(although matters did not end happily).29 
Because of this central flaw in the entail in its capacity to satisfy the 
dynastic urge, the English land conveyancers returned to their drafting 
boards and eventually devised the strict settlement as the most prevalent 
means of tying up lands permanently.30  Conveyancers such as Orlando 
Bridgman31—who worked during the period of the Civil War and the 
Interregnum, when land ownership was dicey32—created models that others 
                                                                                                                   
 25 Id. 
 26 See GEORGE ROSS, THE LAW OF ENTAIL IN SCOTLAND AS ALTERED BY THE ACT OF 1848, at 
4–7 (1848) (discussing the Act of 1685, authorizing the creation of entails). 
 27 See CHARLES NEATE, THE HISTORY AND USES OF THE LAW OF ENTAIL AND SETTLEMENT 9 
(1865) (“This Law of Entail remained in force about 200 years, when a method of evading it 
was discovered, and established by judicial authority, though not by actual decision, which, to 
the uninitiated reader, appears like a trick of legal legerdemain.”); see also BAKER, supra note 
16, at 319–20. 
 28 FELICITY HEAL & CLIVE HOLMES, THE GENTRY IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1500–1700, at 
44 (1994). 
 29 Id. at 45. 
 30 LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 1601–1740: THE ADOPTION OF THE STRICT 
SETTLEMENT, at xiii (1983). 
 31 See NEATE, supra note 27, at 13–14 (describing the creation of the contingent remainder 
and the strict settlement). 
    32 See, e.g., H.J. Habakkuk, Marriage Settlements in the Eighteenth Century, 32 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y (4th ser.) 15, 24 (1950); see also Reid, supra note 
23, at 268–69 (summarizing Henry Frederick Howard’s dilemma of providing for his younger 
children upon the disposition of one of his estates, which was to go to his insane eldest son). 
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would follow in tying up lands for good.  The strict settlement still relied on 
the entail, but only in the background.  The basic trick was to ensure that the 
tenant in possession was always a life tenant, not the tenant in tail (because a 
tenant in tail could always suffer33 a common recovery and thus bar the 
entail).  Thus, O would convey a life estate to his son A, a remainder of only 
a life estate to A’s son B, and then a remainder in tail to the unborn son of B 
(with the ultimate remainder going off to other members of the family if 
necessary).  That way, the tenant in tail would not have full possession (and 
thus the ability to bar the entail) until B’s son stood to inherit at B’s death.  
When B’s son came of age or upon B’s son’s contemplated marriage, B 
would turn to his son and have a frank discussion about the family lands, 
suggesting that they settle the whole thing so that B’s son would have a life 
estate instead of an estate in tail, and the unborn son of B’s son would be the 
tenant in tail.34  This would probably be a rather abstract conversation, and 
B’s son would likely be confused and simply agree to go along. 
Why would B’s son do this?  After all, once B died, his son could have 
the family land, disentail it, and sell the whole thing off.35  There are several 
reasons why B’s son would follow his father’s advice.  As suggested above, 
B’s son may not have understood what exactly is involved and may have 
been misinformed.  The son might also be obedient and want to get on with 
his life in society.  Bear in mind that the strict settlement was a transaction 
that B’s son saw only twice in his life, once as obedient or ignorant son and 
once, much later, as protective father.36  The solicitors may have explained 
everything as well as possible—and, given the state of legal education at the 
time, they themselves may not have completely understood all of the reasons 
                                                                                                                   
 33 The term “suffer” for a common recovery is a term of legal art.  As Baker explains: 
In its simplest form, an accomplice brought a real action against the tenant in 
tail on an imaginary title in fee simple; the tenant vouched a third party to 
warrant his title; the vouchee defaulted; and judgment was given for the 
accomplice to recover the fee simple against the tenant in tail.  Of course, if 
the claim had been genuine, the tail would necessarily have been barred; the 
right in fee simple could hardly be destroyed by a usurper giving the land 
away in tail.  The effect of the warranty, however, was to give the barred 
issue a right to recover land of equal value against the warrantor who 
defaulted.  And this right to assets made the recovery effective even where 
the title was fictitious. 
BAKER, supra note 16, at 319 (footnote omitted); see also SIMPSON, supra note 20, at 130–31 
(discussing the development of the common recovery). 
 34 See BAKER, supra note 16, at 332–35 (providing an overview of the process of the strict 
settlement). 
 35 See id. at 334 (noting that once the eldest son reached the age of majority, he could bar 
the entail). 
 36 Id. 
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for tying up lands in this fashion37—but, alternatively, the family may not 
have appreciated the intricacies of the strict settlement and, given the societal 
norms of the time, may not have cared in any event. 
There was another reason for B’s son to agree to this new settlement, 
especially if the settlement came in contemplation of marriage: The family of 
the future wife of B’s son would have insisted upon it.  John Habakkuk has 
made an exacting historical examination of land settlements in contemplation 
of marriage.  As he explains: 
Family provision was a reason, independent of dynastic 
ambition, for setting a high value on the integrity of the 
paternal estate and one which moved the family of the wife and 
not only that of the husband.  The wife’s family was concerned 
to ensure that the husband could not impair his ability to 
provide for wife and younger children by dissipating his estate 
or by disinheriting them, and the most effective way of doing 
this was to ensure that he was made a life tenant.38 
Typically, charges were made on the family estate (i.e., provision for an 
annual payment out of income and profits that the land produced, rather than 
an ownership interest in the land itself) to provide for younger sons and any 
daughters, and these charges on the estate were binding on the holder of the 
estate.39  The strict settlement thus protected all members of the family, not 
just the eldest son. 
Thus, by the time that Austen wrote, the entail still existed, but was used 
only as a means of preserving distant future interests in land and thus 
keeping the land within the family as part of a larger settlement.  It 
nevertheless remains to be seen how Austen envisioned the settlement of 
Longbourn.  Specifically, was Longbourn held in a strict settlement, or was it 
simply entailed? 
                                                                                                                   
 37 See Habakkuk, supra note 32, at 26 (“[A]s more estates became subject to settlement, an 
increasing amount of knowledge about marriage prospects became concentrated in a few 
London conveyancers.”). 
 38 JOHN HABAKKUK, MARRIAGE, DEBT, AND THE ESTATES SYSTEM: ENGLISH 
LANDOWNERSHIP 1650–1950, at 14 (1994).  In this context, younger children includes all 
daughters, because the presumption was that the eldest son would inherit the family estate 
under the rule of primogeniture.  See Karen Stakem Hornig & Craig J. Hornig, Law and 
Literature Series: Austen on Estates and Trusts, 43 MD. B.J., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 50, 52. 
 39 Habakkuk, supra note 32, at 17–23. 
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III.  ENTAIL: NOVELISTIC TREATMENT 
Despite the common practice at the time to use the strict settlement, there 
are two reasons to believe that Longbourn was simply entailed.  The first is 
the direct evidence from the text.  The second is indirect evidence from a 
roughly contemporaneous novel also involving the entail as a central plot 
device.  That novel, which is not nearly as widely-read as Pride and 
Predjudice (because it is much less enjoyable), involves a Scottish (and thus 
not barrable) entail. 
A.  
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice refers to the entailment specifically.  The 
reader first learns of the entailment in chapter seven: “Mr. Bennet’s property 
consisted almost entirely in an estate of two thousand a year, which, 
unfortunately for his daughters, was entailed in default of heirs male, on a 
distant relation. . . .”40  When Austen wrote Pride and Prejudice, did she 
mean that Longbourn was entailed in the technical sense (i.e., the sort of 
estate that could be created after the statute De donis), or did she mean that 
Longbourn was settled under a strict settlement that involved some limitation 
over to male heirs?  The text itself and attempts to explain the device in the 
novel suggest that Longbourn was entailed. 
1. 
In some ways, this question could be dismissed as pointless:  Pride and 
Prejudice is a work of fiction.  That easy observation could be easily 
accepted, except for the fact that Austen, as an observer of contemporary 
facts (including troop movements and property settlements for marriages), is 
dead on.  She tells us of the soldiers that would have been in Derbyshire 
during the time of Pride and Prejudice (of course in a way that advances her 
plot concerning one of the silliest daughters, Lydia).41  In other works, 
Austen accurately estimates the amount that an upper-middle class woman 
would need to be settled upon her to put her in the position to marry a rich 
man.  For example, Trevor Lloyd, relying on Habakkuk’s detailed work, has 
demonstrated how exact Austen was in Mansfield Park when it came to the 
amount of money necessary for a father to settle on his daughter so that she 
                                                                                                                   
 40 AUSTEN, supra note 10, at 20 (emphasis added). 
 41 See WARREN ROBERTS, JANE AUSTEN AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 96 (1979) (“The 
soldiers who became part of a vastly larger wartime army, and were billeted most heavily in 
Southern England, made their presence felt in Pride and Prejudice.”). 
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could marry a man of a particular station.42  Yet when it comes to how 
property would actually be bound up, Austen is ambiguous.  As suggested 
earlier, most English families at the time of the Bennets probably would not 
have used the entailment standing alone precisely because it could be 
barred.43 
Heal and Holmes claim that by the late 1600s settlements typically 
favored immediate family members other than the eldest son over the eldest 
sons of distant relatives.44  Thus, they assert the plot of Pride and Prejudice 
“hinges on an almost inconceivable determination under a strict 
settlement.”45  “Estates were secured by the strict settlement for the nuclear 
family; the claims of the wider lineage on the patrimony were neglected.”46  
It was not impossible for an estate to be settled in the manner that Longbourn 
is described, but it simply was not done at the time. 
Nevertheless, an examination of the references that Austen makes to the 
settlement of Longbourn indicates that the property was entailed, not strictly 
settled.  First, Austen always refers to the legal condition of Longbourn using 
the term “entail,” and only sometimes uses “settlement” or “settled.”  The 
longest discussion of the entail occurs in chapter thirteen, when the reader 
first learns of Mr. Collins, the distant relative who stands to inherit 
Longbourn.  After exciting his wife and daughters with the announcement 
that they would have a visitor for dinner—perhaps a suitor for one of the 
daughters?—Mr. Bennet informs them that it will be “ ‘my cousin, Mr. 
Collins, who, when I am dead, may turn you all out of this house as soon as 
he pleases.’ ”47  Mrs. Bennet reacts with horror, blaming Collins for the fate 
that will befall her daughters.  “ ‘I do think it is the hardest thing in the world 
that your estate should be entailed away from your own children,’ ” she 
complains, “ ‘and I am sure if I had been you, I should have tried long ago to 
do something or other about it.’ ”48 
Is Mrs. Bennet suggesting that there is something that could have been 
done?  Perhaps she knew something about the nature of an entail and 
specifically that it could be barred.  After all, her brother-in-law was an 
attorney in Meryton,49 and perhaps he had suggested barring the entail before 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Trevor Lloyd, Myths of the Indies: Jane Austen and the British Empire, 21 COMP. 
CRITICISM 59 (1999). 
 43 See supra Part II. 
 44 HEAL & HOLMES, supra note 28, at 46–47. 
 45 Id. at 46. 
 46 Id. 
 47 AUSTEN, supra note 10, at 46. 
 48 Id.  
 49 Id. at 26. 
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to Mrs. Bennet.  The reaction of Jane and Elizabeth to calm their mother, 
however, closes that possibility: 
 Jane and Elizabeth attempted to explain to her the nature of 
an entail.  They had often attempted it before, but it was a 
subject on which Mrs. Bennet was beyond the reach of reason; 
and she continued to rail bitterly against the cruelty of settling 
an estate away from a family of five daughters, in favour of a 
man whom nobody cared anything about.50 
Jane and Elizabeth are the two sensible daughters, and Austen would not 
give Mrs. Bennet special knowledge in this one particular context when 
Austen portrays her as foolish in all others. (To be fair to Mrs. Bennet, she 
rightly regarded the situation for her daughters as desparate, since there was 
apparently no income for them after Mr. Bennet’s death.)  Mr. Bennet 
regards Collins’s inheritance as a “ ‘most iniquitous affair,’ ” adding that 
“ ‘nothing can clear [him] from the guilt of inheriting Longbourn.’ ”51  
Although Mr. Bennet apparently regards the situation with disdain, rather 
than as a fact of life, he might also be speaking with the combination of 
sarcasm and placation that he uses throughout the novel when addressing his 
wife.  As the reader learns later, this quote might also reflect guilt that he 
himself feels regarding the situation of Longbourn. 
When Collins arrives, he “examined and praised . . . [t]he hall, the dining-
room, and all its furniture.”52  Mrs. Bennet, who normally would walk out of 
her way to hear praise, was nevertheless mortified with the “supposition of 
his viewing it all as his own future property.”53  This passage is hard to 
dissect, because personal property like furniture could not be entailed; only 
realty could be.54  Austen attributes the thought to the senseless Mrs. Bennet, 
who overreacts to most things.  After all, for example, Mrs. Bennet supposed 
that her mild-mannered and feckless husband would fight a duel with the 
scoundrel Wickham after he eloped with the youngest daughter, Lydia.55 
Austen sprinkles allusions to the legal status of Longbourn a few times 
subsequently.  For example, Mrs. Bennet believes that Charlotte Lucas, who 
marries Collins, is scheming “to turn [Mrs. Bennet] and her daughters out of 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Id. at 46.  Even though Austen uses the term “settle” in this passage, it is clear from the 
context that the focus is on the entailment. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 49. 
 53 Id. 
 54 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *113 (“[M]ere personal chattels, which favour not at all 
of the realty, cannot be entailed.”). 
 55 AUSTEN, supra note 10, at 213. 
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the house as soon as Mr. Bennet were dead.”56  Lady Catherine de Bourgh, 
Collins’s patroness, asks Elizabeth about her family history and status, 
observing: 
 “Your father’s estate is entailed on Mr. Collins, I think.  For 
your sake,” [Lady Catherine said,] turning to Charlotte, “I am 
glad of it; but otherwise I see no occasion for entailing estates 
from the female line.—It was not thought necessary in Sir 
Lewis de Bourgh’s family.”57 
Thus, everyone knew of the entailment, the shape it took, and the 
consequences it would have for the Bennet daughters.  Everyone also 
referred to it as an entailment. 
The only other long discussion of the entailment of Longbourn appears in 
chapter fifty.  Lydia has eloped with Wickham, “one of the most worthless 
young men in Great Britain.”58  To induce him to marry Lydia, Mr. 
Gardiner—Mrs. Bennet’s brother—meets with Wickham and arranges to 
have his debts paid and a portion of Lydia’s interest in her mother’s property 
settled upon Lydia.59  This passage is enlightening with regard to the legal 
situation of Longbourn for two reasons.  Obviously, money has been settled 
upon Mrs. Bennet, which Wickham has made a condition of his marriage to 
Lydia (or at least their English marriage—the text is not entirely clear about 
whether Lydia and Wickham ever made it to Gretna Green).  Obviously, 
Mrs. Bennet’s family had taken what would have been the usual course of 
action at that time and had guaranteed her income that could be passed to her 
daughters.  The other part of the demand was that Mr. Bennet would provide 
100 pounds per year during his lifetime.60  This language strongly suggests 
that Austen knew the difference between a settlement and an entail and that 
she depicted Longbourn as falling under the latter legal situation.  If 
Longbourn were strictly settled with a provision for daughters, Wickham 
would have likely demanded Lydia’s share of that as well. 
Despite this means of reconciling the situation and believing that 
Wickham must have received more—that “ ‘Wickham’s a fool if he takes her 
[Lydia] with a farthing less than ten thousand pounds’ ”—Mr. Bennet rues 
the financial details of the arrangement.61  If ten thousand pounds were laid 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Id. at 66. 
 57 Id. at 123. 
 58 Id. at 229. 
 59 Id. at 224. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 226. 
2013] A FUNHOUSE MIRROR OF LAW 623 
 
out and if Mr. Gardiner had covered it, then Mr. Bennet would be indebted to 
his brother-in-law for the rest of his life.  (It turns out that Darcy covered the 
debts, and learning this act of kindness was one of many things that turned 
Elizabeth’s heart toward him, leading to the happy ending.62)  Thus believing 
himself in debt to his brother-in-law, Mr. Bennet regrets his habit of 
spending and not saving throughout his marriage to better provide for his 
children and wife after his death.  The reason he had not saved more was his 
expectation for what would happen to Longbourn: 
 When first Mr. Bennet had married, economy was held to be 
perfectly useless; for, of course, they were to have a son.  This 
son was to join in cutting off the entail, as soon as he should be 
of age, and the widow and younger children would by that 
means be provided for.  Five daughters successively entered 
the world, but yet the son was to come; and Mrs. Bennet, for 
many years after Lydia’s birth, had been certain that he would.  
This event had at last been despaired of, but it was then too late 
to be saving.63 
This passage suggests that Austen represents Longbourn as being held 
under a strict settlement.  After all, the passage states that the son was to 
“cut[ ] off the entail” after reaching the age of majority.  That statement 
suggests that the property would be settled upon the son through the 
formalities of the strict settlement. 
Upon closer examination, however, Austen’s representation of Longbourn 
was an estate held under an entail.  First, as stated above, it was unusual for 
property to be strictly settled in such a way that only a male heir could inherit 
it or that the daughters would be completely bereft.64  Second, the reference to 
the son cutting off the entail when he reached the age of majority describes the 
popular and legal conception of how the entail worked: having a son who 
came of age meant that he would inherit the property and thus cut off the effect 
of the entail.  Third, the fact that Lydia’s share of Mrs. Bennet’s money would 
permanently go to her and Wickham, but only a small sum during Mr. 
Bennet’s lifetime could come to Wickham with Lydia’s hand in marriage, 
suggests that everyone in the novel knew that Longbourn was entailed, not 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Id. at 239–43.  To be sure, this act of kindness was not the only reason that Elizabeth 
changes her mind about Darcy, since she jokingly admits to Jane that she first started to 
consider Darcy romantically when she saw the lovely and extensive grounds of Pemberley, 
Darcy’s estate.  Id. at 280. 
 63 Id. at 229 (emphasis added). 
 64 See supra Part II. 
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strictly settled.  Again, if there were a strict settlement, it would likely come 
with shares for every one of the Bennet children, and Wickham would have 
almost certainly demanded Lydia’s portion. 
Thus, after examining all of the direct textual references in the novel to 
the legal status of Longbourn, one must conclude that Austen meant that 
Longbourn was entailed, not strictly settled.  If that is the case, then Mr. 
Bennet could have barred the entail.  Everyone in the novel seems 
completely unaware of that fact or at least never mentions it. 
2. 
A few scholars have tried to explain the situation in the novel.  Gunter 
Treitel attempted to solve the “legal puzzles” that Austen created in Pride 
and Prejudice.65  As for why “no steps were taken to bar the entail,” Treitel 
explains that Mr. Bennet must have been the life tenant holder under a 
subsequent resettlement and not the tenant in tail; the tenant in tail would be 
the unborn son, not Mr. Collins.66  Collins was only the heir apparent of 
Longbourn and could thus not help the situation while Mr. Bennet was alive 
even if he wanted.  The law would presume that Mrs. Bennet could have a 
son until the day she died (no matter how much both of the Bennets 
despaired of that).67  Mrs. Bennet could also have died before Mr. Bennet, 
who could then remarry and have a son through his second wife.68 
Although this solution to the puzzle makes sense, Treitel recognizes that 
the failure of a family to bear a male heir was not unthinkable and that a 
decent conveyancer would have made some protection for Mr. Bennet’s 
widow and any surviving daughters if he had no son.  The only explanation 
that Treitel can give for this lack of forethought and protection is “that the 
estate was too small” to leave any portions to surviving daughters.69  But a 
decent lawyer at the time would have realized the possibility of the Bennets 
not having a son to inherit Longbourn or that son dying before Mr. Bennet.  
Surely leaving the income of Longbourn to Mrs. Bennet for life and then 
dividing it amongst the daughters would be a better result than allowing Mr. 
Collins to inherit it. 
The device that would most likely act remorselessly and allow Longbourn 
to pass to a distant male heir was the entail, the term that Austen used.  Thus, 
to the extent that Austen was precise in her definitions, Longbourn was 
                                                                                                                   
 65 G.H. Treitel, Jane Austen and the Law, 100 L.Q. REV. 549, 557–84 (1984). 
 66 Id. at 563–64. 
    67 Id. at 565. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. at 566. 
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entailed, not held under an unusual strict settlement.  And if Longbourn were 
entailed, Mr. Bennet could have easily left his library one day, asked his 
brother-in-law the solicitor to draft the necessary papers, engaged the 
services of a barrister, barred the entail, bequeathed the property to 
whomever he wished, and then retired to his precious library for the rest of 
his life. 
In another attempt to explain the entailment in Pride and Prejudice, 
Luanne Bethke Redmond simply asserts that Longbourn must have been 
settled under a strict settlement.70  She provides little evidence for her 
conclusion.  Redmond does acknowledge Taltarum’s Case, but she makes up 
her own version of what the entailment in the Bennet family must have been, 
and concludes that “Mr. Bennet was not tenant in tail of Longbourn,” 
because, if he were, “he could have used [the common recovery] to convey 
his property, possibly to his daughters, or in trust for their benefit.”71  This 
conclusory statement assumes the answer to the question, which is whether 
Longbourn was entailed or settled by a strict settlement.  My argument 
remains, though, that Longbourn was entailed and that Mr. Bennet could 
have used a common recovery to convey the property to his daughters. 
More recently, Sandra Macpherson has examined the entail in Pride and 
Prejudice.72  Macpherson starts with the assertion that there is no sense in 
trying to “blame Mr. Bennet or Mr. Collins:  the former couldn’t have done 
‘something or other’ about the disinherision of his five daughters; the latter 
bears no particular distinction in or responsibility for being ‘favored’ by the 
inheritance.”73  But Macpherson, despite her extensive use of legal history 
sources, misstates the relevant law.  She claims that Austen “call[ed] an 
‘entail’ what by 1813 [when Austen wrote] could only have been a strict 
settlement.”74  Macpherson bases this argument on her assumption that the 
entail was done away with by the juridical adoption of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.75  But entails were never subject to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.76  Macpherson also argues that, from Austen’s perspective, 
“with respect to the question of the agency and durability of the donor’s 
                                                                                                                   
 70 Luanne Bethke Redmond, Land, Law and Love, 11 PERSUASIONS 46, 49–51 (1989). 
 71 Id. at 49. 
 72 Macpherson, supra note 20. 
 73 Id. at 2. 
 74 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 443 (Roland Gray ed., 4th 
ed. 1942).  For support of this assertion, Macpherson relies on BAKER, supra note 16, at 332.  
Baker discusses the strict settlement but never asserts that the Rule Against Perpetuities is the 
reason for the adoption of the strict settlement.  Indeed, in his discussion of the strict 
settlement, Baker does not mention the Rule Against Perpetuities.  See id. at 332–35. 
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will—and especially with respect to the question of gender—fee simple, fee 
tail, and strict settlement are structurally identical.”77  That statement may 
accurately reflect what Austen thought about different ways of holding lands, 
but it does not mean that Austen knew the law correctly.  Fee simple, fee tail, 
and strict settlement are not “structurally identical” from a legal perspective.  
Fee simple is an interest that can be left to whomever holds the fee.  Fee tail 
limits the discretion of the present holder but gives that person an out, 
namely, suffering a common recovery.  Strict settlement requires more steps 
but requires each generation to agree to it.  Macpherson may have correctly 
intuited Austen’s thoughts about Longbourn, but her arguments in no way 
show that Austen thought that Longbourn was settled under a strict 
settlement. 
If these scholars are incorrect, as I have argued, then the most likely 
conclusion is that Longbourn was settled under an old-fashioned entail.78  
Macpherson also acknowledges that “[e]ntails were alive and well in 
Scotland until the mid-nineteenth century. . . .”79  The fact that entails were 
“alive and well in Scotland” provides a critical counter-example to Austen’s 
version.  While Pride and Prejudice offers an account of land law in 
England, Scottish novelist John Galt found similar melodramatic possibilities 
in his literary depiction of an entail story set in Scotland. 
B. 
John Galt’s The Entail, or the Lairds of Grippy80 is relatively 
contemporaneous with Pride and Prejudice (1822 for Galt, and 1813 for 
                                                                                                                   
 77 Macpherson, supra note 20, at 8. 
 78 A blogger who writes under the name EnglishDR has noted that the entail could be 
broken under English law and asserts that “Mr. Bennet had more options than he realised, and 
the Bennett [sic] daughters were placed under enormous fear for their future because the 
Bennett [sic] family lawyer does not seem to have been aware of barring actions.”  
EnglishDR, Prejudiced Inheritance, Xomba U (Feb. 15, 2011, 4:47 PM), http://englishdr.xom 
ba.com/prejudiced_inheritance.  This blogger goes on to argue that “Mr. Bennet could have 
negotiated with his heir.”  But, as a living person, Mr. Bennet did not have an heir.  Mr. 
Collins was simply an heir apparent.  And barring the entail involved no negotiation 
whatsoever.  I agree with EnglishDR’s argument that Austen “needed the hopelessness of the 
Bennet daughter’s [sic] situation for dramatic effect [and that f]or this reason, she 
purposefully seems to have ignored the legal solutions to the plight of [her] protagonists.”  Id. 
As I argue below, however, it is not clear whether Austen knew any of the niceties of legal 
settlements and entailments. 
 79 Macpherson, supra note 20, at 20 n.32. 
 80 GALT, supra note 18.  I should note that there appears to be no connection between this 
novelist and the protagonist of Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged.  See Shoshana Milgram, Who Was 
John Galt?, in ESSAYS ON AYN RAND’S ATLAS SHRUGGED 53, 76 n.13 (Robert Mayhew ed., 
2009). 
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Austen).  Galt himself was a Scot.81  He nevertheless studied law in England 
and was a member of Lincoln’s Inn in London.82  Although he led a fairly 
peripatetic life, Galt enjoyed a fairly successful career as a writer and left the 
law.83 
The Entail is a mediocre novel at best and certainly not as enjoyable as 
Pride and Prejudice.84  Much of the dialogue is written in Galt’s version of 
Scottish dialect, the characters are fairly obvious in their motivations (since 
Galt explicitly informs the reader of each character’s motivation), and the 
novel lacks Austen’s wit.  Nevertheless, like Pride and Prejudice, Galt’s 
novel employs the entail as a plot device and, in particular for legal purposes, 
the singularly different aspect of the Scottish entail—namely, that it could 
not be barred—as a central point of the novel. 
Because Galt and his novel are probably unfamiliar to readers, a brief 
summary of the melodrama is in order.  The Entail tells the story of Claud 
Walkinshaw and his progeny.  Claud’s grandfather was the laird of an estate 
called Kittlestonheugh.  Claud’s grandfather sent Claud’s father on an 
expedition to the New World, which proved disastrous and resulted in 
Claud’s father’s death, Claud’s mother’s death from a broken heart, 
bankruptcy for the Walkinshaws, and the attendant sale of Kittlestonheugh.85  
Embittered by this series of events, Claud made it his life’s determination to 
restore the Walkinshaws to their proper position and to regain 
Kittlestonheugh if at all possible.  After establishing himself as a merchant, 
Claud purchased the Grippy, part of the former Kittlestonheugh lands.86  
Claud “resolved to marry, and beget children, and entail the property, that 
none of his descendants might ever have it in their power to commit the 
imprudence which had brought his grandfather to a morsel, and thrown 
himself on the world.”87  To fulfill this dream, Claud marries Girzy Hypel, 
the daughter and only child of the Laird of Plealands, who becomes the 
                                                                                                                   
 81 GALT, supra note 18, at xxi–xxii. 
 82 Lincoln’s Inn was and is one of the four inns of court to which a barrister is called.  THE 
HONOURABLE SOCIETY OF LINCOLN’S INN, HISTORY OF THE INN: ORIGINS, http://www.lincolnsi 
nn.org.uk/index.php/history-of-the-inn (last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
 83 GALT, supra note 18, at xxi–xxii.  Perhaps he could be thought of as the John Grisham of 
his day (although Grisham’s novels have probably sold better than Galt’s, and Galt endured 
bankruptcy at one point).  Id. 
 84 This is despite Galt’s claim that The Entail was “a work that will, no doubt, outlive the 
Iliad.”  Id. at 351.  John Cairns suggested to me that this comment was tongue-in-cheek. 
 85 Id. at 3. 
 86 Id. at 12. 
 87 Id.  
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Leddy of Grippy.88  Eventually Claud and the Leddy have four children: 
Charles, Walter, George, and Margaret.89 
Throughout the Laird and Leddy’s marriage, discussions of entailing the 
lands take center stage.  Claud initially decides to entail his lands to 
Charles.90  The Laird of Plealands insists that there be someone to take on his 
surname and the title of Plealands.91  Initially, Claud resists because he wants 
his first born son to have both Grippy and Plealands, but he relents when the 
Leddy bears him a second son, Walter.92  Galt makes clear from the start that 
Walter is a “natural” (i.e., mentally deficient).93  Upon the death of Girzy’s 
father, both the entails for Grippy and Plealands turn out to be defective.94  
This legal error raises the possibility that Grippy and Plealands could be 
united into a property as extensive as Kittlestonheugh.95  The avaricious 
Claud dreams of the prospect. 
As the novel progresses, Charles falls in love with Isabella Fatherlans, the 
daughter of another fallen laird.96  Claud disapproves of this relationship and 
forbids Charles to marry her for a year.  Because of Isabella’s impoverished 
situation, however, Charles disobeys Claud and marries her sooner than the 
year had passed.97  Claud decides that Charles’s disobedience warrants him 
to disinherit Charles from the family lands altogether.98 
The discussions between Claud and his solicitor, Keelevin, regarding the 
entailment of the lands are the most relevant passages of the novel for 
purposes of this Essay because they explicitly discuss the strictness of the 
Scottish entail and the fact that it cannot be barred.  Although Keelevin 
scolds Claud on his proposal to disinherit Charles from the lands,99 Keelevin 
nevertheless agrees to draw up papers entailing both Grippy and Plealands to 
Walter, the second son.  Keelevin draws up the papers, but before he allows 
Claud to sign them, he cautions him: 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Id. at 12, 21. 
 89 Id. at 21, 23–24, 38. 
 90 Id. at 23, 54. 
 91 Id. at 22. 
 92 Id. at 23. 
 93 Id. at 73; see also id. at 60 n.1 (referring to Walter as a “haverel” or half-wit). 
 94 Id. at 30. 
 95 Id. at 31. 
 96 Id. at 41–42. 
 97 Id. at 47. 
 98 Id. at 54. 
 99 Id. at 57 (“ ‘I was thinking ye may be did na reflect that sic an entail as ye speak o’ 
would be rank injustice to poor Charlie, that I hae ay thought a most excellent lad.’ ” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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Noo, Mr Walkinshaw . . . I hope ye have well reflected on this 
step, for when it is done, there’s nae power in the law o’ 
Scotland to undo it.  I would, therefore, fain hope ye’re no 
doing this out of any motive or feeling of resentment for the 
thoughtless marriage, it may be, of your auld son.100 
Claud, determined to press forward, assures Keelevin of his intent and brings 
both Charles and Walter as witnesses to the signing.101 
Walter marries Betty Bodle, the woman whom Claud had originally 
envisioned Charles marrying.  Betty came from a landed family, in contrast 
to Isabella, whom Charles married for love.  Claud then makes an exchange 
of Plealands (which, of course, is really Walter’s) for other lands that made 
up the original Kittlestonheugh.102  Having made this trade of lands, Claud 
nevertheless feels remorse about how he had treated his first born son, 
Charles.103  Charles and Isabella have two children, James and Mary.104  
Walter’s wife dies after giving birth to a daughter, leaving Claud wondering 
whether the trade of Plealands for the other lands to make up the former 
Walkinshaw estate would not leave the lands in the hands of a male heir.105  
Charles discovers the terms of the entail, contracts a bad fever, and dies in 
bitterness.106  Walter is still the remainder in tail, but his mother (the Leddy) 
and his brother George conspire to have him declared mentally unsound, so 
that he cannot manage or inherit the property.107 
These events leave George as the next tenant in succession to the entail.  
By this time, George has married, and he has one daughter, Robina.  At 
Walter’s wedding, Walter’s sister Margaret meets her future husband, Mr. 
Milrookit, the Laird of Dirdumwhamle, who has many children from two 
previous marriages and would like to see any progeny well placed with 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
 101 Id. at 73. 
 102 Id. at 103. 
 103 Id. at 106. 
But keener feelings and harsher recollections were also mingled with that 
regret; and a sentiment of sorrow, in strong affinity with remorse, embittered 
his [Claud’s] meditations, when he thought of the precipitancy with which he 
had executed the irrevocable entail, to the exclusion of Charles; to whom, 
prior to that unjust transaction, he had been more attached than to any other 
human being. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 104 Id. at 123. 
 105 Id. at 114–15. 
 106 Id. at 141–42. 
 107 Id. at 177–79, 201. 
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lands.108  The Milrookits have a son whom they name Walkinshaw, after 
Margaret’s family name.  George, who is now the Laird of Grippy, fancies 
that Robina will marry James, his eldest brother’s son.109  Walter, in the 
meantime, has died, meaning that George is the only living male son of 
Claud and that James is the only existing male in Claud’s line after 
George.110  Despite George’s wishes, James has fallen in love with Ellen 
Frazer, not Robina, and James refuses to marry Robina.111  Robina does not 
care that much because she wants to and does marry Walkinshaw, 
Margaret’s son (i.e., Robina’s cousin), and they expect that they will inherit 
Kittlestonheugh.112  George’s wife dies, however, leaving open the 
possibility that George will have a son if he remarries.  Indeed, George sets 
his eyes on Ellen Frazer (James’s sweetheart) as a possible catch.113  Before 
this intention can come to pass, George dies in a shipwreck.114  At the end of 
the novel, James, the son of Claud’s eldest son Charles, winds up with the 
lands that were originally entailed, since they were entailed to heirs male.115  
Robina cannot inherit the lands because she is female, and Walkinshaw 
Milrookit, having descended from a daughter, also cannot inherit the 
lands.116 
The point of this long description of the novel is to focus on Galt’s use of 
the entail.  It is clear throughout the novel that the entail in Scotland was not 
one that could be broken.  Galt is quite clear that the entail was irrevocable 
and that there was nothing to be done, unless there was a defect in the 
instrument or the tenant in tail was mentally incompetent (as was the case for 
Walter).  Galt does not draw out the distinction explicitly—for example, he 
never has the lawyer Keelevin say, “there’s nae power in the law o’ Scotland 
to undo it, unlike in England.”  Nevertheless, this situation contrasts with the 
English entail, in which there was a patent way of ending it.  If Longbourn 
was entailed, as I believe it was, then Mr. Bennet could have barred the 
entail, had he wanted to. 
                                                                                                                   
 108 Id. at 108. 
 109 Id. at 223. 
 110 Id. at 218–19. 
 111 Id. at 226 (showing James saying “ ‘I’ll never marry for money.’ ”). 
 112 Id. at 258–59. 
 113 Id. at 316. 
 114 Id. at 322. 
 115 Id. at 323. 
 116 Id. at 338–39. 
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C.   
Speculation alone determines what the legal situation was for Longbourn.  
We know from Pride and Prejudice itself that Austen understood some of 
the differences between the English and Scottish law.  The best evidence is 
the elopement between Lydia and Wickham.  It is significant that the Bennet 
family speculated, on the basis of her letter, that Lydia and Mr. Wickham 
had eloped to Gretna Green.117  Gretna Green is one of the southernmost 
Scottish cities, and the marriage laws in Scotland and England at the time 
were vastly different.  At that time, a couple could not marry in England 
without parental consent unless the parties were at least twenty-one.118  By 
contrast, at that time Scots law permitted couples to marry without parental 
consent when the parties were as young as twelve for the female and fourteen 
for the male.119  Readers in Austen’s day would have known exactly why 
Lydia and Wickham eloped to Gretna Green—to her audience it would have 
the same impact as a couple eloping to Las Vegas would to an American 
audience today.120 
In the same way, Galt’s novel gives us additional insight into what 
contemporaneous audiences would have known about the two legal systems 
and perhaps their notions about the entail.  Galt was quite explicit about the 
fact that the entail Claud executed could not be barred in the future and the 
complications it raised for his family.  It was no mystery that two very 
different systems functioned on the same island.  What remains to be seen is 
whether Austen and her audience knew as much about the entail as they did 
about Gretna Green marriages. 
IV.  HOW SHOULD WE READ THE ENTAIL IN PRIDE AND PREJUDICE? 
Thus, if I am correct that Austen intended to make Longbourn subject to 
the strict form of an entailment, the essential question becomes whether 
Austen knew of the potential for barring the entail or whether she did not.  
Of course, one might also wonder whether her audience knew or did not 
                                                                                                                   
 117 AUSTEN, supra note 10, at 202–03. 
   118 Rebecca Probert, Control over Marriage in England and Wales, 1753–1823: The 
Clandestine Marriages Act of 1753 in Context, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 413, 422 (2009) (“The 
point is rather that the normative framework of the canon law required parental consent, and 
that those minors wishing to marry without such consent had to resort to evasive measures.”). 
   119 Leah Lenerman, The Scottish Case That Led to Harwicke’s Marriage Act, 17 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 161, 162 (1999). 
 120 Cf. GALT, supra note 18, at 286 (referring to a Gretna Green marriage from the Scottish 
perspective). 
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know about the details of the entail.  The possibilities can be depicted on the 
following chart: 
 
 Austen Does Not Know Austen Knows 
Audience Does Not 
Know 
Most likely Unlikely—Austen would have 
to be extremely arch and 
clairvoyant 
Audience Knows Unlikely—use of the fee tail 
in the novel would have been 
criticized 
Possible and interesting 
 
As indicated on the chart, there are four possibilities.  Two strike me as 
unlikely.  It is unlikely that Austen knew about the ins and outs of the 
entailment while her audience did not.  Although Austen was an astute 
observer of her society, her commentary of that society using the device of 
the common recovery when her audience was clueless would have had to be 
extremely ironic or clairvoyant.  After all, she would be making oblique 
reference to a situation that she knew Mr. Bennet could have defeated yet did 
not, thus casting aspersions on him in the process, even though her audience 
would not pick up on the joking criticism.  Thus, she would not reach her 
audience and would be writing for modern critics in the hope that they would 
pick up on the message.  And even if that were her intent, she failed, for, 
although a few modern observers have noticed that Austen’s use of the 
entailment is strange or anachronistic, none have noticed any message that 
she was trying to send across centuries. 
The other unlikely possibility is that Austen’s readership knew about the 
limitations on the entailment but that Austen did not.  If this were the case, 
the novel would not have succeeded and become popular.  More likely, it 
would have been dismissed as silliness.  If everyone knew that Mr. Bennet 
could have barred the entail, then why all the fuss about getting the daughters 
married off?  As mentioned above, if that were the case, Mr. Bennet could 
have arranged for the appropriate papers to be executed and left the property 
to whomever he wished, retiring to his precious library for the rest of his 
sullen existence knowing that his daughters were taken care of.  The novel 
would have ended just after chapter thirteen. 
The most likely scenario is that neither Austen nor her readership knew 
about the exact rule of property settlement in England.  Austen clearly knew 
the terms entail and settle, as in settlement upon marriage, and the basic 
structure for how marriage settlements worked.  Nevertheless, Austen leaves 
much ambiguity and makes mistakes, as she seems to have done with Mrs. 
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Bennet’s worries that Collins would wind up not only with Longbourn but 
also with all of its contents, which, as shown above, was not possible under 
an entail. 
If this scenario is correct, then what consequences follow?  It means that 
we have an accurate depiction of a society that is totally out of touch with a 
body of law that was nevertheless essential to familial relationships and land 
ownership.  This conclusion is surprising unless we accept the wide 
disjunction between law and society.  Generally, however, most people 
believe that law accurately reflects the values or cultural norms of a given 
society.  Alan Watson has bravely shown this not to be the case. 
In some ways, this disjunction occurs regularly in many areas of the law, 
but goes unnoticed.  After all, as mentioned previously, the complicated 
transactions necessary for the continuation of the strict settlement were ones 
that a man would see no more than twice in his life:  once when he came of 
age and once as older parent.  The implications of these transactions could 
very well have been lost on those who participated in it. 
A contemporary example helps illustrates the point.  As a young man, I 
knew that I wanted to attend college and law school.  I knew that all of this 
had to be paid for.  In order to pay for part of this, I took out student loans, 
mostly because my parents told me that I had to help finance a portion of my 
education (and I am eternally thankful that they financed most of it).  At the 
time, I had a superficial understanding that the money would have to be 
repaid at some point, but I had no idea of the effect repaying the loans would 
have on my monthly budget, what legal obligations I was undertaking, and 
what impact it would have if I could not repay.  I certainly did not know 
whether student loans were dischargable debts in American bankruptcy law 
(they certainly are not now except in rare circumstances121), what impact 
default could have on my credit rating, or exactly how much would be due 
and when.  All of this was beyond anything but the vaguest of my 
understanding.  I just wanted to pursue my educational goals and dreams.122 
Similarly, a young man in the late eighteenth century, such as a young 
Mr. Bennet, probably did not know all of the ins and outs of property 
settlement.  If he were a real person, he may have not known the implications 
of the property settlement or the power he may actually have had to watch 
out for his daughters.  His understanding may have ended at thinking that 
having a son was the only way to keep Longbourn in the family.  The idea 
                                                                                                                   
 121 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006). 
 122 Just to reemphasize, I am grateful that my parents financed most of it through their hard 
work, savings, and then putting their trust in me to make it happen.  I hope I’ve done them 
proud. 
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that he would have only daughters, and the implications that would follow if 
that were to occur, was probably beyond his comprehension. 
If this is the case, then it offers one lesson about the relationship between 
law and societal values.  Legal ignorance prevails over legal knowledge.  
People often operate under rational apathy.  They sign contracts that they do 
not read closely; they click through agreements online so that they can 
download software or a video that they want; they do not inspect real estate 
as carefully as they should because they have fallen in love with a house they 
wish to buy; they talk to police thinking that their cooperation will help 
them.  Lawyers often enter the disputes that arise from these situations 
wondering:  What were these clients thinking?  The answer is typically that 
these clients were not thinking; they were acting and getting on with their 
lives.  Legal ignorance—especially about technical details—is not surprising 
among those who do not have legal training. 
Nevertheless, the more intriguing scenario for contemplating the 
relationship between law and society is if both Austen and her readers knew 
that an entail in England could be barred.  If this were the case, two 
interrelated implications immediately leap forth.  First, the character of Mr. 
Bennet must be reread.  This point is probably of more interest to Austen 
scholars and fans.  Most readers generally sympathize with Mr. Bennet 
because he is largely surrounded by folly, because he is witty, and because 
he favors Elizabeth, the heroine, and recognizes her intelligence.  These 
features—especially that he can find intelligence in a woman, and 
particularly in the early nineteenth century—are attractive to a modern 
audience.  They make him seem urbane and progressive.  A Mr. Bennet who 
could, but did not, provide for his daughters, however, becomes a much less 
appealing character.  Why would Mr. Bennet not disentail the property if he 
could?  Perhaps it was simply not done, or not an option to a family of the 
social class or status of the Bennets. 
This observation brings up the second implication of the speculative 
possibility that both Austen and her readers knew that an entailment could be 
barred.  Austen was clearly pointing out the worst scenario in which an entail 
would harm the sympathetic and reward someone much less deserving.  
After all, Mr. Collins is not only a blowhard, a sycophant, and a fool, but he 
is also a distant relative and the son of someone Mr. Bennet detested.123  The 
reader never learns what caused the rift between Mr. Bennet and Mr. 
Collins’s father, but Austen makes sure that no one will find this oaf likeable.  
                                                                                                                   
 123 See AUSTEN, supra note 10, at 47 (detailing a letter from Mr. Collins to Mr. Bennet 
expressing hope of healing the rift that had existed between Mr. Bennet and Mr. Collins’s late 
father). 
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Evidently, though, the social pressures and expectations compelled Mr. 
Bennet to acquiesce in the wishes of a distant family patriarch, even at the 
expense of his own immediate family.  If this scenario is the case, then once 
again law provides recourse that few apparently turned to and thus does not 
reflect the underlying feelings of the society about property. 
If this possibility is the case, then literary analysts and critical legal 
scholars might latch on to Pride and Prejudice to support their point: that 
law is largely established by the ruling elite to protect the ruling elite and 
entrench its values at the expense of the downtrodden, including the poor, 
women, and racial minorities.  Pride and Predjudice does not advance this 
agenda well, however.124  All of the elaborate rules regarding the entail and 
property settlements affected only the rich; the poor and the working class 
had nothing that could be affected by this body of law.  Readers worry about 
the fate of Elizabeth and Jane and breathe sighs of relief when they are taken 
care of in marriage.  Few even comment on Hill, their faithful and patient 
servant who undoubtedly had no worries about entailed lands or distant 
relatives who would take her patrimony, because she had none. 
Similarly, Pride and Prejudice makes clear that some landed families 
guarded the interests of their female members more closely than the Bennets.  
Lady Catherine de Bourgh serves as a noteworthy example of such, and she 
makes it clear when she rubs Elizabeth’s face in the difference between the 
settlement of the Bennet lands and the de Bourgh lands.  After all, she makes 
a point of telling Elizabeth that entailing lands only to male heirs “ ‘was not 
thought necessary in Sir Lewis de Bourgh’s family.’ ”125  This example 
makes clear that the law itself did provide a means for protecting the future 
of daughters like the Bennets, either through the terms of an entailment itself, 
proper negotiation at the time that the property was strictly settled, or 
through the suit for the common recovery.  Rather, societal norms constituted 
the means of oppression, not the law itself.  It was custom, convention, or 
tradition—but not law itself—that drove the central conflict in Pride and 
Predjudice. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice illustrates the often unnoticed tensions 
between a society and its law.  Austen may have used the entailment of 
Longbourn as nothing more than a convenient plot device, one that neither 
she nor her audience fully understood or cared to understand fully.  Law 
                                                                                                                   
 124 I have made similar observations about the Rule Against Perpetuities.  See Peter A. 
Appel, The Embarrassing Rule Against Perpetuities, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264, 278 (2004). 
 125  AUSTEN, supra note 10, at 123. 
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misunderstood by literary authors—law reflected poorly in literature—
supplies an interesting commentary on the relationship between law and 
society.  The entailment of Longbourn worked well as a motif and impetus 
for relationships because people cared then (as now) more about blossoming 
romance between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy than the technicalities of land law 
in England.  As Alan Watson has taught us, however, people should care 
about both to avoid funhouse mirror distortions. 
